A Voice For the Voiceless

MISSION

The Advocacy Project seeks to help community-based advocates produce, disseminate and use information, and so become more effective advocates for human rights and social justice

The Challenge of Reconstruction

For five years following the Dayton Peace Agreement, Srebrenica remained physically, economically, and psychologically isolated. Time stood still in this once-flourishing town. Its broken buildings, its dispirited inhabitants, its lack of economic vitality -- all these were a reminder of the terrible events that took place here in the summer of 1995.

More than any other town in Bosnia, Srebrenica has resisted reintegration. An estimated 30,000 Bosniacs were expelled from Srebrenica. According to the UN, 92,061 refugees and displaced persons returned to their homes in Bosnia in 2001 to live in areas where they are in a minority. But only 118 Bosniac (Muslim) families returned home to the municipality of Srebrenica. While this represented an increase over the 60 families who returned in 1999, it was still negligible.

The reasons were many. In the first place, there is almost no economy to return home to. Most of the factories surrounding Srebrenica are destroyed, and there are currently no plans to repair them. Unemployment runs at around 80 percent.

Second, Bosniac homes are taken up by displaced Serbs who were themselves expelled from other parts of Bosnia during or after the war, and transported to Srebrenica to live out a drab existence. Many left the Serb suburbs of Sarajevo in the spring of 1996.


Photo credit: Iain Guest
The March 31, 2003 Srebrenica Burial Ceremony

Third, there is the issue of security. Bosnian refugees who have attempted to return home to Srebrenica since 1996 have faced intimidation and violence from nationalist politicians in the Serb Republic, and from locals in the Srebrenica region.

These problems are interconnected. For several years, the international community withheld aid from the region in an effort to force local politicians to permit minority returns. While understandable, this only perpetuated Srebrenica’s economic distress and added to the misery of the town’s temporary population. It also meant that returning Muslim refugees had little to come home to.

The prospects for Srebrenica’s former inhabitants are intimately linked to those displaced Serbs currently living in the town. Bosniac refugees cannot reclaim their homes in Srebrenica until the present Serb occupants are allowed to return to their homes elsewhere in Bosnia. That has not been possible, owing to the slow implementation of property laws in other parts of Bosnia.

Yet another problem is lack of information. Many potential returnees do not know how to use laws to their advantage, nor do they have access to simple information about which houses have been repaired and evacuated.

In recent months, these formidable obstacles have started to look less formidable. The international community has made a determined effort to standardize and implement property laws uniformly across the country, opening the way to returns. Several obstructionist officials in Srebrenica have been dismissed or replaced.

Most important, courageous refugees have started to take matters into their own hands and are going home to villages on the outskirts of Srebrenica. In June 2000 a group of displaced Muslims returned to the village of Suceska, in the hills above the town. This provided the psychological breakthrough, and Muslim refugees began to return to Srebrenica proper. And on March 1 of this year, 35 families returned to Osmace, another village.

This progress -- small but significant -- encouraged aid donors to lift their embargo of Srebrenica. On May 13, 2002, the UN Development Program (UNDP) launched a $13 million, three-year Srebrenica Regional Recovery Program. Thirty donors were invited, and as of August 31, $4.9 million has been pledged towards the target of $12 million. Bilateral aid has also started up on a modest scale.

At the same time, it will be some time before this translates into results. Of the $4.9 million, $2.1 has been offered by the Bosnian Serb Republic. Italy is the only Western government to offer a substantial amount ($1,350,000). This suggests, at the very least, that many donors still have considerable reservations.

One thing is clear: reconstruction will be hampered until the sensitive but fundamental issue of accountability has been resolved. The trauma of the 1995 massacres still haunts potential returnees. Everyone from Srebrenica knows someone who was killed, and most lost at least one family member. A small handful of high-level Bosnian Serbs have been indicted and/or arrested for crimes committed at Srebrenica, but the man considered directly responsible -- the former Bosnian Serb Army Chief Ratko Mladic -- remains at large. Many locals from the Srebrenica region were also complicit in the massacre, but still live in Srebrenica.

The lack of accountability has compounded Srebrenica’s grim history and given the region a reputation as a breeding ground for lawless profiteers and separatists. Clearly, this must change before investors can be persuaded to take a chance on Srebrenica. Refugees too will be reluctant to return home as long as they know the killers remain at large. A process to ensure accountability will encourage reconciliation between the Serbs and Muslims in Srebrenica because it will mean that responsibility for the crimes can then be placed on the individuals responsible, instead of holding all Serbs accountable.

All of this presents a formidable challenge for the international community, and for Srebrenica’s inhabitants. At its most basic, the challenge is to keep the attention of the world focused on Bosnia at a time when there are many other pressing demands on aid. After seven years and many billions of dollars, some donors are ready to give up on Bosnia.

As is so often the case after a war, the initiative has been seized squarely by civil society. One of the most impressive groupings is the Forum of Srebrenica NGOs, a network of eight organizations that was formed in 2001.

The Forum’s member organizations have an impressive track record in working not just for the return of refugees, but for reconciliation between Bosniacs and Serbs. To qualify for membership, they must engage in humanitarian work and lobby for two-way return.

The Forum and other NGOs show how civil society can jumpstart the slow and painful reconstruction of Srebrenica, opening a breach for the international community to follow. For years, they have braved threats and intimidation. They are rebuilding homes, with very few resources. They have shown the international community how the wounds can be healed -- without compromising on justice. The following pages tell their inspiring story.