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Strategies for Resistance: Negotiation Versus Opposition

In the course of resisting oil development in the Amazon, environmentalists and organizers have been confronted by a major dilemma over resistance strategy. Should they fight to end all oil prospecting, using all the tactics of civil disobedience? Or should they "acknowledge reality" and negotiate for the best possible deal?

At issue are two quite different approaches to the defense of the Amazon, both risky. Negotiation with oil companies puts communities in danger of cooptation and division, while absolute opposition risks marginalization and defeat.

In their hearts, environmentalists would prefer that no more oil be taken out of Ecuador, and here and there communities have succeeded in staving off oil development, at least temporarily. But some activists feel strongly that this approach is not practical for the whole of the Oriente. After all, they say, indigenous communities are impoverished and inexperienced, and the oil companies are crafty. Poor communities are susceptible to bribes and to the use of divide-and-conquer tactics by the companies, as well as possible use of force by the government. All this makes it probable that drilling will continue.

Rather than espouse strict adherence to one approach, the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CDES) advocates resistance where it is realistic, and the strengthening of activists’ negotiating skills where compromise is necessary. If communities can be educated in the best ways to organize, it is possible to succeed with both approaches: in some places oil development may be prevented; in others, its impact may be best controlled through negotiations.

Villano: A Case Study in Divide and Conquer Tactics

The case of Villano provides an illustration of the way oil companies divide communities in order to exploit their resources more easily. By bribing local leaders, or even "inventing" them, a company can use the divisions that result to its own advantage.

Practically every company that has worked in Ecuador has attempted to "divide and conquer" a territory in this way, devaluing the principle of representation until it means only that which is convenient to the company.

Santiago Kawarim, President of the Achuar Federation explains the modus operandi of oil companies such as Burlington. "The politics of negotiation of these companies are dirty, tricking the leaders with small candies like airplane rides, invitations, money, and in this way entering their territories. Then, when they enter the territory, they contaminate the rivers and emit dirty gases that contaminate the air, which kills animals. Then what are we going to eat? Where are we going to hunt? How are we going to feed our children?" asks Kawarim. - Amazon Watch

Villano is located in oil concession Block 10 in the western part of Pastaza province. In the early 1990s, Arco and its partner, the Italian company Agip, succeeded in splitting off Villano and acquiring permission to build an oilfield. The oil developers bestowed relatively generous resources on Villano, including several schools and clinics, in return for the right to drill.

In return, Villano’s local leaders withdrew from participation in OPIP (the Organization of Indigenous People of Pastaza), the representative of Pastaza’s indigenous communities. Villano was thus bought cheaply, and the rest of the affected area was deprived of resources. Furthermore, the area around Villano itself has now been endangered by leaking pipelines.

Mr. Cesar Cerda, an activist with OPIP, recounted what happened in Villano: "The oil companies bought Villano things to persuade them to cooperate: schools, food, and free airplane flights into the community. They gave money to the leaders of the villages. They also organized a false ‘community organization’ that they named ‘Asodira.’ "

Asodira was composed of around 100 members of the community, some of whom were employees of Arco or relatives of these employees. This is what activists refer to as a "phantom" organization. It contrasts with OPIP, which represents 20,000 people.

As Mr. Cerda noted, "OPIP should not ask for help for one community alone, and a company should not only help one community." Villano is a stinging repudiation of this principle. It is the position of OPIP, and of every other organization that spoke with The Advocacy Project, that a company must negotiate with the legitimate recognized representative of an affected indigenous community.

(In 2000 Arco turned over control of Block 10 to Agip.)

The Struggle for Representation: Some Successes

In the past few years, there have been some significant victories for the principle of representation.

One occurred after some members of the Secoya indigenous community signed an agreement with Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) in 1966, under what were later termed "coercive circumstances."

The Secoya communities have a population of several hundred and share territory in the northeastern part of the Oriente with the Siona, a nation of similar size. In 1985 Oxy had acquired the 200,000-hectare oil concession Block 15, covering part of this territory, and developed several oilfields. The company then began negotiating with individual Secoya communities for further exploration rights.

Oxy’s negotiation tactics included both bribes and threats. In exchange for chain saws, medicine chests and rain coats, one community signed an agreement that allowed the company the right to conduct vaguely-defined "petroleum activities" in the indigenous territories of Block 15. Occidental’s chief negotiator had warned Secoya representatives that if they did not sign an agreement, the government would confiscate their land. He also threatened military action.

Other Secoya and Siona communities located in Block 15 were outraged. In 1999 OISE, the organization representing all Secoya communities, filed a protest against the agreement. It eventually succeeded in forcing a re-negotiation, and Oxy retracted the contract.

The re-negotiation led to the creation of a "Code of Conduct" for future negotiations between the Secoya and Occidental Petroleum. The Code of Conduct requires Occidental to negotiate exclusively with OISE as the only legitimate representative organization of the Secoya. It outlines transparent and honest methods of negotiation. This achievement provided a precedent for other indigenous organizations throughout the Oriente to insist on proper representation.

Further to the south, the Shuar and Achuar nations won a similar case in 1999, repelling an attempt by Arco to sidestep established representatives in order to explore for oil. Arco leased the license to prospect in Block 24, in Morona Santiago and Pastaza provinces, in 1998. Block 24 includes territory inhabited by the Shuar and Achuar, two closely related indigenous communities.

When Arco received its concession, company representatives began visiting individual Shuar families, offering them small favors in return for the right to explore for oil. Arco persuaded some villagers to allow oil exploration in three communities, in return for $3,000 per community.

In August 1999, in response to protests, a civil court handed down a decision prohibiting Arco from dealing with individual Shuar families or communities, requiring the company to negotiate exclusively with the general assembly of FIPSE the Shuar representative body. While such a legal precedent does not carry the same weight of law in Ecuador that it would in the United States legal system, the decision validated the concept of legitimate representation. The injunction did not explicitly prohibit Arco from drilling in Block 24, but it slowed down the company’s operations significantly.

While the two cases described here strengthened the respective communities in the face of the divide-and-conquer tactics of the oil companies, they were still isolated examples rather than established legal principles. They certainly do not benefit every community in the Oriente.

Given this, the likelihood remains that oil companies will still try to divide communities when they can and negotiate fairly only when they are forced to do so.

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