A Voice For the Voiceless

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The Advocacy Project seeks to help community-based advocates produce, disseminate and use information, and so become more effective advocates for human rights and social justice

Slow Justice

It is often difficult to balance the demands of justice against the practical requirements for peace and reconciliation. The greater the crimes, the larger the dilemma -- or at least so it has seemed in Srebrenica.

The arguments for justice are psychological, ethical and even political. Muslim survivors still do not know what happened to their relatives, and they naturally demand that the killers be brought to justice. They are also alarmed at the thought of returning back and encountering Serbs who might have killed their loved ones. “People left their homes because of the actions of those criminals,” said Izet Mehinagic, a displaced person from Srebrenica. “They fear to return while they are still there.”

Photo credit: Associated Press 

Wanted: Radovan Karadzic, the former head of the Bosnian Serbs, and Ratko Mladic, former head of the Bosnian Serb Army, have both been indicted by the Hague tribunal for genocide and crimes against humanity, committed at Srebrenica.

There is another important argument in favor of prosecutions: punishing the guilty would lift the miasma of collective guilt that now hangs over Serbs living in the Srebrenica region.

But some of Srebrenica’s Serbs feel differently. Some still defend their wartime leaders. Others, while they might agree that the guilty should be brought to justice, believe that further arrests might destabilize already volatile communities.

As these pages have shown, the international community and the presence of international peacekeepers have helped to create an atmosphere of security that makes it easier for refugees to return. But the world has yet to firmly grasp the nettle of accountability.

Justice has been left to the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague, which was created by a resolution of the UN Security Council in May 1993. There was, at the time, considerable skepticism that the tribunal was a substitute for a more robust response by the UN to war crimes, and the tribunal had to struggle to establish its credibility.

As of October, 2002, the tribunal has issued 80 indictments, made nearly 50 arrests, and completed trials for 16 defendants. These trials have created an important legal and political precedent, and Srebrenica has featured prominently. The Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps, a unit of the Bosnian Serb army, Radislav Krstic has been sentenced to 46 years in jail for his role in the massacre.

Another critically important case involved Drazen Erdemovic, a Croat who was forced to participate in the killings. Erdemovic surrendered himself to the tribunal and helped to provide a wealth of information about the massacres, including the precise location. The arrest and detention of Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia, has also demonstrated that the international community can muster up the resolve to bring high-profile criminals to justice (although Milosevic's theatrics in defending himself at The Hague have certainly reduced the court's credibility.)

Nonetheless, the tribunal still has a long way to go in having a direct and measurable impact on reconciliation and reconstruction of Srebrenica.

Reversal of Fortune: A survivor from Srebrenica watches the trial of Slobodan Milosevic on television.

Photo credit: B92 

The main problem is, of course, that hundreds -- perhaps thousands -- of those who participated in the 1995 massacres have not even been indicted, let alone arrested. General Ratko Mladic, the leader of the Bosnian Serb Army, and Radovan Karadzic, the wartime president of the Serb entity (Republika Srpska -- RS), were both indicted in November 1995 for directing the Srebrenica massacres. The charges against them include genocide, crimes against humanity, and “violations of the laws or customs of war.” The 20-count indictment lists violations of the UN-established safe area, looting and burning of houses, mistreatment of prisoners of war, arbitrary killings, summary execution, and massacre.

But seven years after the indictment, both men remained at large. The ICTY itself lacks power to mandate arrests. It relies on local authorities -- in this case the Bosnian Serb authorities -- who are supposed to make the arrests but never do. Many members of the current RS government still feel loyalty to Karadzic: even those who oppose him would not take the risk of arresting a perceived champion of Serb nationalism.

The task of arresting war criminals thus falls to SFOR (NATO) troops, but they are only required to arrest war criminals if they come across them in the performance of their regular duties. In February 2002 there was an attempt by American SFOR troops to arrest Karadzic when he was spotted in a village near Foca. He escaped. SFOR won’t discuss the incident, but it is rumored in Bosnia that nine or so American troops were killed. The Americans blame a French spy for Karadzic’s escape, but it’s also possible that they just botched the mission. NATO’s commanders are clearly worried that Karadzic has surrounded himself with a small army of security guards. Those governments whose troops might be at risk are most reluctant to back such an operation, because they fear it might trigger a domestic backlash against the Bosnia peacekeeping mission.

Just before the general elections in Srebrenica in 2000, the International Crisis Group reported some of the implications of this stalemate: “Karadzic and Mladic have become symbols of national defiance to Bosnian Serbs…[they] represent the single knot holding together a twisted thread of collective and individual guilt that must be untied for Bosnia to begin the reconciliation process. [They also] represent a reason to be cynical about the international community and pessimistic about the chances for ethnic reconciliation, as well as a reason not to return home.” (p.77)

In spite of this, the tribunal’s direct impact on the reconstruction of Srebrenica has been limited. One reason is that Bosnians have had difficulty following the proceedings. The International Crisis Group’s report asserted that “the day-to-day proceedings of the court could directly undermine the nationalist rhetoric and misinformation spread by many of Bosnia’s politicians, provided that citizens had better access to the proceedings….but as long as Bosnia’s residents are unable to follow the court proceedings, nationalist politicians will effectively advance their claims that the court is biased and politically motivated.” (p. 75) Since 2000 things have improved somewhat, and according to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, press coverage of the tribunal has become more thorough and consistent in recent months.

The tribunal’s location in the Netherlands -- a long way from Bosnia -- has also reduced the value of its proceedings for the survivors of Srebrenica. Another problem is the tribunal’s focus on high-profile trials. While they naturally support the trials at The Hague, and the punishment of the war criminals, survivors say that they are most discouraged from returning by the presence of “small-time” war criminals who are still part of the separatist power structure in Srebrenica. Thousands of these people assisted in the deportations and mass executions. In all likelihood, they will never be identified and punished.

One positive sign for the tribunal: some Srebrenica survivors have petitioned to get onto the guest list at The Hague. As arrests become more frequent, local interest in the ICTY has increased, alongside local press coverage. Despite all the doubts about the ICTY, the skepticism may be softening.

Incomplete justice is not the only obstacle. Many Srebrenicans still want to know why it took the UN and Dutch authorities so long to even issue reports that examined their respective responsibilities in the massacre. The Dutch government only published its explanation in the spring of 2002, in a 7,900 page report. Hasan Nuhanovic, chair of the Association of Srebrenica Victims, wrote an open letter to the Dutch Parliament criticizing the fact that “[t]he report did not answer to the urgency of the matter and was completed and presented to the public almost seven years after the events in Srebrenica.”

Survivors are also in anguish that there has yet to be a funeral. As Beba Hadzic from Bosfam noted, “Seven years have passed, and there has been no funeral. The funeral is a prerequisite for return.” Exhumations of mass graves continue on a regular basis around Bosnia, and as of spring 2002, nearly 5000 bodies remained stored in a tunnel near Tuzla. Only a few hundred have been identified, and only recently has DNA testing equipment been made available.

These unburied remains are painful reminders that the ghosts of Srebrenica are far from laid to rest. Moreover, the repercussions continue to reverberate far beyond Bosnia.

The year 2002 saw the release of no fewer than three reports from Holland on the role played by the UN's Dutch contingent of peacekeepers. Everything seemed to conspire against these unfortunate soldiers. They faced a ruthless foe in the Bosnian Serbs, were hopelessly outnumbered, betrayed by their superiors, and hobbled by an impossible mandate.

Reaching out across the ethnic divide: members of the Yugoslav organization Women in Black commemorate the sixth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre in Belgrade.
Photo credit: B92 

Nonetheless, their performance during Srebrenica’s final agony has continued to haunt the Dutch people. In the spring of 2002 it even provoked the fall of the Dutch government. It was a sad irony that one of Europe’s worst massacres should claim one of the few governments in Europe that had a wholehearted commitment to human rights and justice.

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